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THE PRESENT POSTURE OF FRANCHISING
HUGH B. HELM*
ECENT INCREASE in the use of franchising in merchandising,
particularly in new commercial ventures involving copyrights
and trademarks, necessitates a review and an analysis of the
present posture of the law applicable thereto.
Jurisdiction over these matters is in the Department of Justice un-
der the Sherman Act1 and in the Federal Trade Commission under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act' and Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'
Some lawyers approach the subject of franchising by sorting out
and labelling franchises into different types, brands, or kinds. This
is not necessary, and, in fact, leads to error, since the law of fran-
chising is the same regardless of how the franchise is characterized.
Therefore, this article will not define a franchise or franchises, but
will rather say at the outset as at the conclusion: there is no legal
magic in the word "franchise."
The Commission's leading decision involving franchising is Car-
vel Corporation.4 Subsequently, the Commission issued a number
of illuminating advisory opinions with respect to franchising.5 More
recently, in File No. 693 7036 and File No. 693 7043, the Com-
mission was requested to issue advisory opinions with respect to
proposed franchise agreements, but it declined to issue them be-
* MR. HELM is Chief of the Division of Advisory Opinions, Federal Trade
Commission and Acting Director of the Bureau of Industry Guidance, Federal
Trade Commission. He is a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising,
Federal Trade Commission and the A.B.A. Trade Association Committee. MR.
HELM is a member of the Kentucky, Tennessee and United States Supreme Court
Bars.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
4. Carvel Corporation, F.T.C. Docket 8574, Slip Opinion (July 19, 1965).
5. F.T.C., Advisory Opinion Digest No. 18, file no. 663 7004; F.T.C., Advisory
Opinion Digest No. 72, file no. 663 7053; F.T.C., Advisory Opinion Digest No. 254,
file no. 683 7125; F.T.C., Advisory Opinion Digest No. 278, file no. 683 7150.
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cause of insufficient information without investigation as provided by
1.1 (a) and 1.1 (c) of the Rules of Practice. 6 The touchstone by
which the Commission has tested restrictions in franchise agreements
has been whether or not the restraint imposed on trade thereby is
reasonable.7 The question arises as to what extent, if any, the policy
enunciated in Carvel, and followed in four subsequent advisory
opinions, has been modified in light of the more recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court involving franchises: Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.;8 Albrecht v. Herald Co.;9
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.;1" FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.;"
and FTC v. Texaco Inc.12 What are the implications, if any, of these
cases for the future approach toward franchising?
CONSEQUENCES OF Carvel
In Carvel, the Commission considered a franchise agreement con-
cerned with the manufacturing and selling of soft ice cream. Under
the franchise agreement, to protect the end product and the image of
the franchisor, the dealer was required to purchase from Carvel, or
from sources designated by Carvel, his entire requirements of mixes,
toppings, flavors, cones and any other items which constitute a part
of the end product sold at retail. The dealer was also required to
purchase and use only the manufacturing and dispensing freezer
manufactured by Carvel and was encouraged to purchase his other
associated equipment from Carvel. The dealer was given some
latitude in purchasing other equipment from other sources with the
approval of Carvel, but was closely supervised in the purchase and
use of such equipment (actually the examiner had found that Carvel
discouraged this practice and that relatively little equipment was pur-
chased by dealers from suppliers other than Carvel). The dealers
were also required, by the terms of the franchise agreement, to oper-
ate in strict accord with the standard operating procedures prescribed
by Carvel which regulated the operations of the store and equipment,
6. 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1969).
7. Supra note 4.
8. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
9. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
10. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
11. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
12. 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
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the sanitation procedures to be followed, the methods to be used
with respect to flavoring, freezing and dispensing the ice cream mix,
and the varieties of ice cream and other products which may be
manufactured from the basic mix. Dealers were not permitted
to manufacture or handle any product not specifically prescribed by
Carvel. The franchise agreement authorized Carvel to inspect the
store records and operations of the dealer at such times as he de-
sired. The franchise agreement was effective for a five year period
with a five year renewal option. Breach by the dealer of any of the
terms of the franchise entitled Carvel to terminate the franchise, with
liquidated damages against the dealer. In the event of the termina-
tion of a franchise, irrespective of the cause, Carvel had the right
to purchase all of the dealer's machinery and equipment in the store
at a depreciation of its original cost of fifty per cent during the first
year, with further depreciation in later years. Upon termination, the
dealer was prohibited by the agreement from engaging in the sale
of frozen dairy products for a period of three years within three
miles of the store he operated.
In the order dismissing the complaint, which was brought against
Carvel under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
Commission set aside the hearing examiner's initial decision concern-
ing the franchise agreement and Carvel's operations thereunder. The
Commission concluded
that the hearing examiner was wrong in his conclusion (1) that the Carvel agree-
ments were a part of a general plan and purpose to restrain interstate commerce,
and (2) that the restrictions imposed on Carvel's licensees were not reasonably
related to Carvel's right-and obligation-to control the quality of its trademark
product and the identity and image of its trade name. 18
The Commission also held that there had been a failure of proof
as to anti-competitive effects.
In Carvel, the Commission tested restrictions in the franchise
agreement by the touchstone of whether the restraints imposed on
trade thereby were reasonable. This test was applied with protection
of the quality of the end product in mind. The four advisory opinions
involving franchise agreements which have been prepared subsequent
to the Carvel decision have applied the doctrine enunciated by the
Commission in Carvel. However, the restrictions on franchisees con-
sidered in the four advisory opinions were far less burdensome than
13. Supra note 4, at 12.
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those involved in Carvel. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 278 was
concerned with the franchising of pizza shops. The franchise was
not restricted, for example, in sources from which he might ijurchase
his mixes and supplies. The nature of the product or service in-
volved and the particular problems presented in the three other re-
quests for Commission consideration raised, generally, different issues
than those involved in Carvel. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 18 in-
volved a franchise for a service of dispatching written communica-
tions. Advisory Opinion Digest No. 254 involved a franchise for
a service of providing a comprehensive check-cashing program. Ad-
visory Opinion Digest No. 72 involved the franchising of tape re-
corders and accessories. Food recipes and the preservation of the
quality of end products were not involved. The restrictive covenants
in the franchises were far less onerous than those in Carvel, giving
the franchisees great latitude in buying and selling without any
coercion.
Subsequent to the issuance of its advisory opinions dealing with
franchising, the Commission decided the L.G. Balfour Co.' 4 case in
which there is a suggestion that Brown Shoe limits the application of
Carvel. Commissioner Jones, who prepared the opinion in Carvel
as well, frankly states in Balfour:
In Carvel, we found that the franchise agreement was an exclusive distributorship
and the substantiality of foreclosure should be evaluated under Tampa's criteria.
Both of these cases preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Brown Shoe Co.,
supra, which reaffirmed the Commission's right to strike down restrictive agree-
ments even without proof that the contracts amount to a full-fledged violation of
§ 315 when the proceeding is under § 5.16 The court was satisfied that Brown's
14. F.T.C. Docket 8435, Slip Opinion (July 29, 1968).
15. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964) provides: "That it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease
or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, sup-
plies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption
or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof of the District of Colum-
bia or any insular possession or other under the jurisdiction of the United States, or
fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the
condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of
such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understand-
ing may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce."
16. The Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1967),
provides in relevant part: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."
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franchise program conflicted with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman
Act 1 7 and § 3 of the Clayton Act and held that in declaring the franchise program
unfair the Commission acted well within its authority, even in the absence of a
showing of the § 3 element of "substantiality."' 8
DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO Carvel
All of the potential issues that might arise in connection with fran-
chising were not considered in Carvel. Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court subsequent to Carvel dealing with various
aspects of franchising will now be examined for possible implica-
tions as to the Court's attitude toward franchise agreements:
FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.
In Brown Shoe, the Court was concerned with a record which
showed
beyond doubt that Brown, the country's second largest manufacturer of shoes,
has a program which requires shoe retailers, unless faithless to their contractual
obligations with Brown, substantially to limit their trade with Brown's competitors.
This program obviously conflicts with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman
Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take away freedom of pur-
chasers to buy in an open market.1 9
The Court had no difficulty in finding that the Commission has the
power under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to ar-
rest the indicated trade restraints in their incipiency. Brown Shoe
would indicate a limitation on the restraints which a franchisor might
impose on a franchisee with respect to his freedom to purchase in
the open market, but it should be remembered that the Court specifi-
cally noted that Brown is the second largest manufacturer of shoes.
FTC v. Texaco
Also subsequent to Carvel, the Supreme Court decided the Texaco
case. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated:
That Texaco holds dominant economic power over its dealers is clearly shown by
17. The Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides in relevant part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal."
18. Supra note 14, at 41. Ct. subsequent Texaco doctrine of inherent coer-
cion, intra notes 20 and 22 and accompanying text.
19. Supra note 11, at 321.
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the record in this case. In fact, . . . [Texaco does] not contest the conclusion of
the Court of Appeals below and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Shell
that such power is "inherent in the structure and economics of the petroleum dis-
tribution system." 20
In reaching unfair methods of competition in Texaco under Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act Mr. Justice Black said:
While the success of this arrangement in foreclosing competitors from the TBA
market has not matched that of the direct coercion employed by Atlantic, we feel
that the anticompetitive tendencies of such a system are clear, and that the Com-
mission was properly fulfilling the task that Congress assigned it in halting this
practice in its incipiency. The Commission is not required to show that a practice
it condemns has totally eliminated competition in the relevant market. It is enough
that the Commission found that the practice in question unfairly burdened competi-
tion for a not insignificant volume of commerce [citations omitted].
The Commission was justified in concluding that more than an insubstantial amount
of commerce was involved.21
The result in Texaco is well characterized by Mr. Justice Stewart in
his dissent as a "per se rule of 'inherent' coercion. '"22 Thus, when
the Commission proved the powerful economic set-up of Texaco,
it could infer that the competitive injury was substantial. It is,
therefore, safe to assume that if the Commission had had before it in
Carvel the Brown Shoe and Texaco opinions, proof of competitive
injury would not have been required.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
In Schwinn, the Court was concerned with a franchising plan in
the retail bicycle industry which restricted the retailers' freedom as
to the territories in which they might sell and the customers to
whom they might sell. The Court held that in the normal business
situation, the franchisor's restrictions on franchisee's freedom with
respect to territories and customers is illegal per se under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act."2  The Court characterized the normal business
situation as that in which the manufacturer parts with title, dominion
or risk with respect to the article. The Court also noted that Schwinn
"was not a newcomer, seeking to break into or stay in the bicycle
business. It was not a 'failing company.' On the contrary, at the
initiation of [the offending] practices it was the leading bicycle pro-
20. Supra note 12, at 226.
21. Supra note 12, at 230.
22. Supra note 12, at 232.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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ducer in the Nation." 2' The significance of this caveat for future
cases involving franchises cannot now be predicted with confidence,
but the Court very well might not apply the rule enunciated in Sch-
winn to comparatively small or new franchise operations or involv-
ing products substantially different from bicycles. Furthermore, a
vertical situation where title is retained is not typical of a true fran-
chise agreement.
United States v. Sealy, Inc.
In United States v. Sealy, Inc.,"5 the Court was concerned with so-
called franchise agreements involving territorial restrictions in the
mattress manufacturing industry. These arrangements were not
true franchise agreements conferring rights and privileges from the
top down, inasmuch as the members were the owners. In view of the
Court's analyzing these agreements as constituting horizontal terri-
torial limitations, this opinion adds little to a projection of the Court's
thinking with respect to true franchises. However, exclusive terri-
tories were prohibited by the Court in these cases, although it was
not on a vertical basis as a true franchise agreement would be.
Albrecht v. Herald Co.
In Albrecht, the Court was concerned with an agreement between
a franchisor and franchisee whereby the franchisor fixed maximum
prices at which his product (a daily newspaper) was to be sold by
the franchisee. The Court applied the doctrine of Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc.2" and held that such an agree-
ment between franchisor and franchisee to fix maximum prices is a
per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.
In Perma Life Mufflers, the Court was concerned with franchise
agreements involving shops for the repair and replacement of auto-
mobile mufflers. The issues before the Court were essentially pro-
cedural, but it may be said that in dealing with those issues the Court
24. Supra note 10, at 374.
25. 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See also United States v. Serta Assoc., Inc., 269 F.
Supp. 1121 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
26. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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expressed a "mood" of hostility to unreasonable and oppressive re-
strictions in franchise agreements. A reading of the case reveals
there was substantial agreement in all five opinions of the majority
that the franchise agreement between Midas and its franchisees con-
tained illegal restrictive covenants, bearing on exclusive territories,
full-line forcing or tying arrangements of mufflers and tail pipes,
and buying only from franchisors. Of course the Court was not
ruling on the franchise agreement as such, but on a preliminary mat-
ter; however, its opinion plainly indicates how the majority felt
on the subject of rights of franchisees.
The foregoing summary of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions concerning franchise agreements suggests that in the par-
ticular areas with which the cases are concerned, the general ap-
proach in Carvel of testing the proposed restriction in terms of rea-
sonableness would no longer be followed. Furthermore, the
Court's opinions to which we have referred, generally reflect a hos-
tility to restraints which franchisors may impose upon franchisees.
It may be doubtful whether the doctrine of ancillary restraints as
first enunciated in U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Company,27 was
ever helpful in analysis, but in view of the Court's decisions in Sch-
winn and Brown Shoe, it is apparent that such doctrine now is likely
to blur rather than facilitate analysis. What the Court is increasingly
concerned with is the actual impact of restrictive arrangements on
competition.2"
CONCLUSION
The characterization of the arrangement between a supplier and
a dealer as a franchise is of no particular legal significance in the
applications of laws administered by the Commission. To the con-
trary such characterization may lead to confusion in the analysis of
the legal issues involved. Definitions breaking franchises down into
categories are not helpful. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
given evidence of viewing historical franchise arrangements more
critically than heretofore and has expressed a mood of hostility toward
all burdensome restrictions on franchisees.
The legality of a franchise agreement can best be examined in
27. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afj'd 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
28. See White Motor Company v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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terms of the factual pattern surrounding the implementation. Usable
general principles, however, can be noted at this time.
On the basis of Supreme Court decisions since Carvel, it appears
that franchisors cannot: (a) fix prices at which sales can be made
by franchisees; (b) generally, cannot restrict franchisees with respect
to their territories and customers. The test of reasonableness
should be applied to other restraints imposed by franchisors or fran-
chisees. Doubtless all restraints on franchisees should be viewed
with a critical eye, the unmistakable trend being toward protection
of franchisees.
Carvel has not been overturned by the Supreme Court, but it has
been considerably modified and its application restricted. What re-
mains is good law, subject to the same touchstone of the reasonable-
ness of any restraints imposed on trade by a franchise agreement in
the areas left untouched. This is but another way to emphasize
effect on competition.
Franchising is here to stay and probably will be on the increase.
It is a simple, easy way to raise capital and to merchandise copy-
righted and trademarked goods. It is also a convenient way to put
a new product on the market, particularly food, without large cash
outlays. Although it affords great opportunity to the small business-
man, it also has great potential for fraud on small investors. It is,
therefore, vitally necessary that franchisees be protected from un-
scrupulous franchisors who use their economic power to over-reach
them.
In considering the lawfulness of franchises in the future, two gen-
eral propositions should be kept in mind: (1) There is no legal
magic in the word "franchise." It is no excuse for placing a
franchisee in an economic strait-jacket or coercing his compliance
with restrictive covenants that restrain competition in favor of the
franchisor; and (2) the increasing concern of the Supreme Court
for the freedom and protection of franchisees under franchise arrange-
ments.
To be specific, it is recommended that franchisors govern them-
selves by the following postulates:
(1) Franchisors cannot fix prices at which franchisees may sell.
(2) Franchisors generally, cannot restrict franchisees in their purchases.
(3) Franchisors cannot generally allocate territories in which franchisees may
sell.
[Vol. XIX: 102
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(4) Franchisors cannot generally dictate customers to whom franchisees may
sell.
(5) Franchisors cannot generally prevent franchisees from selling and carrying in
inventory items other than the franchised items.
(6) Franchisors cannot be arbitrary or economically oppressive in termination
of franchises.
We qualify some of the caveats above with the word "generally"
because of the implication in Schwinn and Simpson v. Union Oil of
California29 to the effect that the smallness of a new business and the
fact that it is entering into a new market may be treated as an ex-
ception by the Court, or the fact that title has not passed in a vertical
merchandising arrangement may also be treated as an exception by
the Court. It is also possible that the Court may apply the de minimis
rule to the effect on competition in cases of obvious insubstantiality.
29. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
